An Empirical Analysis of Employee Ownership, Performance and Governance
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The impact of establishing governance mechanisms on performance in the presence of employee ownership is equivocal and not yet conclusive. This contribution aims to provide evidence, empirically, whether the governance mechanisms having a positive impact on performance and whether this relationship is conditioned by the existence of employee ownership of companies. Our empirical approach, conducted on a sample of 108 French companies listed on the stock exchange at the index 120 and focused on the discriminating analysis technique, certifies that the proxies used for measuring governance mechanisms contribute significantly and positively to the performance of companies while the contribution of employee ownership is proved to be suitable to ensure the company’s performance only if it manages to establish beforehand a good governance system.
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