Re-Examining the Role of Corporate Governance in Controlling opportunistic Earnings Management
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This paper examines whether corporate governance mechanisms affect managers’ earning management tactics at the largest publicly traded bank holding companies in Indonesia, by taking into account one of major economic theories explaining managers’ behaviours: stewardship theory. However, in these cases, stewardship theory provides little help in shedding theoretical light on, and even has no ability to explain agent’s opportunistic behaviours.
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