A Critical Analysis of Stipulating Remuneration Pay in Bangladeshi Listed Companies
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Executive pay in Bangladesh continues to be a topic of conversation. Executive or CEO pay continues to be exceedingly high and growing quicker than the pay of a typical worker. The basic problem with existing compensation system in Bangladesh listed companies is that they focus exclusively on how much CEOs are paid instead of how they are paid. Of course, executive compensation in Bangladesh scenes has attracted considerable public attention and academic interest because of both the magnitude of pay and its relation to corporate performance. This article condenses that charismatic, psychological, and political factors are likely involved in determining executive compensation. According to this logic, firms should strengthen the monitoring system to ensure that the executives do not abuse their power to influence the pay settings. Boards of directors, and more increasingly these days, large institutional investors, are expected to perform such monitoring. Moreover, when the firms strengthen the appearance of shareholder value orientation, executive behaviours need to be closely monitored to ensure that they act in a way that would maximise shareholder wealth.
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