Improving the CSIDH Protocol for Multi-party Cryptography: Rigorous Mathematical Analysis, Efficiency, and Security Comparison

CSIDH post-quantum cryptography, distributed key generation, isogenies, zero-knowledge proofs, Shor’s algorithm, Grover’s algorithm, multi-party cryptography.

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November 3, 2024
October 31, 2024

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This paper introduces a novel Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol based on the Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) framework for secure multi-party cryptography. Our proposed protocol is designed to address scalability and security concerns, particularly in post-quantum cryptographic systems. The main contributions include the introduction of Piecewise Verifiable Proofs (PVPs) for non-interactive zero-knowledge verification of secret shares, and the provision of rigorous security analysis, including resistance to quantum adversaries via Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. We analyze the protocol’s efficiency, ensuring low computational overhead even in large-scale systems, and compare it with other distributed cryptographic protocols such as RSA-based and lattice-based schemes. Through mathematical proofs and complexity analysis, we demonstrate that our protocol offers enhanced security, efficiency, and scalability in a post-quantum environment. The results presented in this paper provide a strong foundation for implementing secure multi-party computations in quantum-resistant systems.